A World of Experts: Science and Global Environmental Constitutionalism by Jasanoff, Sheila
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 40 | Issue 2 Article 6
5-28-2013
A World of Experts: Science and Global
Environmental Constitutionalism
Sheila Jasanoff
Harvard Kennedy School, sheila_jasanoff@harvard.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Politics
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For
more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sheila Jasanoff, A World of Experts: Science and Global Environmental Constitutionalism, 40 B.C. Envtl.
Aff. L. Rev. 439 (2013), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol40/iss2/6
439 
                                                                                                                     
A WORLD OF EXPERTS: SCIENCE AND 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Sheila Jasanoff* 
Abstract: Under conditions of conflict and uncertainty, forging a new con-
stitutional consensus is a monumental task. If we hope to address climate 
change through a new global constitutionalism, we must challenge current 
approaches to assessing the costs, benefits, and uncertainties of environ-
mental regulation, and arrive at an international consensus regarding 
those approaches. In doing so, input from experts in a variety of fields 
should be sought. A positive example of this approach is the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change’s inclusive and democratic process of 
environmental assessment. However, we must avoid abdicating responsibil-
ity in favor of complete reliance on experts, and remind ourselves that ex-
pertise—legal or scientific—should be questioned and tested by democ-
ratic participation. 
Introduction 
 Professors Douglas Kysar and David Wirth have described the 
patchiness of the world order and various barriers to progressive inter-
national action on global climate change—whether they are due to the 
absence of adequate institutions and formal mechanisms, or because 
extant ways of doing business contain principles that do not withstand 
moral scrutiny.1 Professor Kysar referred to the latter situation when he 
discussed his initiative to go before the United Nations and argue that 
the rights or very existence of one community should never fall victim to 
the interests of another.2 That such an argument needs to be made does 
not bode well for global constitutionalism. 
 
* Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology Studies at the Harvard Kennedy 
School. 
1 See Professor Douglas Kysar’s Analysis of Flaws in Predictive International Climate Policy Models, 
40 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 409, 409 (2013) [hereinafter Kysar Executive Summary]; David A. 
Wirth, Engineering the Climate: Geoengineering as a Challenge to International Governance, 40 B.C. 
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 413, 420–36 (2013). 
2 See Kysar Executive Summary, supra note 1, at 406, 411 (describing the plight of Palau, 
a nation whose very existence is threatened by rising sea levels). 
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 My starting point when thinking about the global order is slightly 
different. Coming as I do from a school of government rather than a 
school of law, I have the luxury of asking what it is that makes people 
agree to participate in a system of constitutional governance. Conversa-
tions about a world order among lawyers often carry with them a prior 
assumption—an assumption that existed in both Professor Kysar’s and 
Professor Wirth’s presentations.3 The assumption seems to be that we 
ought to have some sort of global constitutional order, secured if possi-
ble through law.4 In order to avoid rogue action by states that prioritize 
their own interests above another state’s rights, we need to have an in-
tergovernmental constitutional settlement. Interrogating that assump-
tion, we can ask whether the problem of global order today is an ab-
sence of constitutionalism or in some respects its opposite: a premature 
constitutionalism that already exists, partly through the influence of 
science and expertise,5 but whose scope and limitations are not per-
ceived as such or consented to by most citizens of the world. 
I. The Foundations of Global Environmental 
Constitutionalism 
 To approach these questions, I will begin with a lesson that I re-
member vividly from my exposure to a constitutional law class at Har-
vard, taught by one of the great names in the field, Paul Freund. While 
I must admit to not remembering much of what he taught us about 
levels of judicial scrutiny, I do remember a story he told about how 
Brown v. Board of Education6 became a governing constitutional doc-
trine. Although the Court expected the ruling to be incredibly divisive 
at the time, the rejection of the “separate but equal doctrine” came to 
be accepted as canon, so much so that even in our currently polarized 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Kysar Executive Summary, supra note 1, at 411; Wirth, supra note 1, at 435–37. 
4 See Kysar Executive Summary, supra note 1, at 411; Wirth, supra note 1, at 435–37. 
5 See Jasanoff, Reason in Practice, in Jasanoff, Science and Public Reason 1, 1 (2012) 
(asserting that “issues that matter to publics have been prematurely taken out of politics” 
because of “the ascendancy of science and technology”). 
6 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I ), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (declaring the fundamen-
tal principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional); Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ. (Brown II ); 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (considering the question of relief and 
remanding the cases to the District Courts for proceedings and orders “as are necessary 
and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all delib-
erate speed”). 
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times, relatively few people would argue that the Court went wrong in 
overruling this previous constitutional dogma.7 
 Freund told us that Justice Felix Frankfurter, distinguished jurist 
and noted anglophile, had his law clerks read poetry in the morning 
before they advised him on how to ground his decisions and how to 
word his opinions. As the Supreme Court confronted Brown, Justice 
Frankfurter was concerned at the prospect of undermining the ex ca-
thedra quality of Supreme Court judgments and mindful of the Court’s 
reluctance to overrule itself.8 Even more acutely, he was concerned 
with the school districts’ reaction after the Court ruled.9 The “separate 
but equal” doctrine had existed for decades and its meaning was estab-
lished in widespread practice.10 Suddenly, the Court would order the 
schools to dispose of their racially segregated facilities and put people 
of different colors together, equally. Justice Frankfurter understood the 
importance of language in fashioning binding legal rules. He realized 
that the Court’s opinion would need to be crafted so that people could 
clearly understand its intent and seriousness, but also have the neces-
sary time to act upon the decision’s mandate.11 What language could 
convey the Court’s firmness of purpose, and yet leave some flexibility in 
its execution? 
 The day the law clerks were advising Justice Frankfurter in wording 
the Court’s opinion, they read The Hound of Heaven, written in 1893 
by the English poet Frances Thompson.12 Speaking in the first person, 
Thompson describes his dread as he flees the feet of the divine hound 
pursuing him.13 The poem reads, in part: 
Adown Titanic glooms of chasmèd fears, 
From those strong Feet that followed, followed after. 
But with unhurrying chase, 
And unperturbèd pace, 
                                                                                                                      
7 See History of Brown v. Board of Education, U.S. Cts., http://www.uscourts.gov/Education- 
alResources/ConstitutionResources/LegalLandmarks/HistoryOfBrownVBoardOfEducation.aspx (last 
visited May 14, 2013). 
8 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Significance of Brown, 20 Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 1, 6–
7 (2004). 
9 See id. 
10 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540, 552 (1896); see Philip Elman & Norman Silber, 
The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946–1960: An Oral 
History, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 817, 822–23 (1987). 
11 See Elman & Silber, supra note 10, at 827–28. 
12 Francis Thompson, The Hound of Heaven (1893), reprinted in Francis Thompson: 
Poems and Essays 107–13 (Wilfred Meynell ed., The Newman Bookshop 1947) (1913). 
13 Id. 
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Deliberate speed, majestic instancy, 
They beat—and a Voice beat 
More instant than the Feet— 
‘All things betray thee, who betrayest Me.’14 
 The phrase that Justice Frankfurter’s clerks picked up from The 
Hound of Heaven was “deliberate speed.”15 Frankfurter had already 
used that phrase in prior, less momentous opinions, probably deriving 
its use from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.16 With his approval, those 
words became a defining point of the Brown decision and influenced 
how the ruling balanced practicality with the mandate for radical 
change.17 In these multiple translations—from Justice Holmes to Justice 
Frankfurter, from Frances Thompson to Frankfurter’s law clerks, and 
from them via Chief Justice Earl Warren into one of the twentieth cen-
tury’s most celebrated constitutional decisions—we see how the right bit 
of language can help to solve a very pragmatic problem: How do you 
make a radical rule change stick? Brown said schools must desegregate, 
but with deliberate speed, which allowed those affected by the decision 
sufficient time to think things through and take considered action.18 
 Having been born in India, a country colonized by the British 
from the nineteenth century until it gained independence in the mid-
dle of the twentieth, I have often reflected on the power of shared lan-
guage in situations such as the one the Supreme Court faced in Brown. 
What had to happen to allow a consensus to form around a phrase like 
“deliberate speed”? Justice Frankfurter’s anglophilia had to inspire his 
law clerks’ readings of English poetry; and they had to grasp in their 
turn how poetic language might resonate strongly enough to change 
entrenched social expectations. A huge amount of prior cultural work, 
linguistic work, and conceptual work had to be done in order for the 
Court to find language compelling enough to forge a new constitu-
tional consensus under conditions of conflict and uncertainty. 
                                                                                                                      
14 Id. at 107. 
15 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301; see Jim Chen, Poetic Justice, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 581, 591 
(2006). 
16 Chen, supra note 15, at 586; see First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 
328 U.S. 152, 188 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Virginia v. West Virginia, 222 U.S. 17, 
20 (1911). Years after Professor Freund relayed this story to his students, Philip Elman, a 
former law clerk to Justice Frankfurter, would tell the story slightly differently, making no 
mention of the law clerks having discovered the piece of language, but emphasizing the con-
nection to Holmes. See Elman & Silber, supra note 10, at 829–30, 842–43. 
17 See Chen, supra note 15, at 591–92. 
18 See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301. 
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II. Realigning Moral Intuitions with Professional Discourse 
 Shifting focus to the contemporary world order, and to global en-
vironmental debates in particular, one must similarly ask what it would 
take to bring about a radical change in the way people have con-
structed unsustainable preferences. In addition, one must question the 
rationalization of these preferences, using highly technical discourses 
such as welfare economics, whose underlying normative presumptions 
remain resistant to wider questioning.19 What would it take to ratchet 
open the closed discourse of welfare economics and completely re-
frame the discussion, using new terms with new normative implica-
tions? 
 Professors Kysar and Wirth have already suggested some of the 
things we can do. One choice is to take direct action by approaching 
the United Nations with a petition and making a case for action. Unfor-
tunately, for a variety of reasons, we cannot expect this approach to 
succeed immediately in most cases. Of course, if our goal is to bring 
about a change in discourse—and an associated change in conceptual 
thought—then even the relatively small act of making an argument to 
the delegates of the United Nations may prove effective in the long 
term.20 It puts an idea in circulation that may one day bear fruit, nour-
ishing social action. Then, to draw from Professor Wirth’s suggestions, 
we can look at existing spaces of deliberation to find glimmers of 
hope.21 We can use those glimmers, in essence, to guide us in fertiliza-
tion of a different sort—not ocean fertilizing with iron filings that cre-
ate algal blooms22—but with words that encourage new ideas to bloom 
for the benefit of society at large.23 
 The barriers to facilitating such global rethinking are immense 
and must be challenged both individually and collectively by those who 
wish to reform the existing order. We must consider where the concep-
tual barriers to understanding lie—barriers of thought that prevent 
                                                                                                                      
19 See T.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 Econ. J. 696, 701 (1939) (de-
fining “an optimum organisation of the economic system as one in which every individual 
is as well off as he can be made, subject to the condition that no reorganisation permitted 
shall make any individual worse off”). 
20 Cf. Nan D. Hunter, Health Insurance Reform and Intimations of Citizenship, 159 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1955, 1981 (2011) (asserting—in the health care context—that activists achieve their 
goals “in the opportunity created by the legislative debates and electoral campaigns to 
build public participation in the discourse of individual liberty as superior to collective 
obligation”). 
21 See Wirth, supra note 1, at 433–37. 
22 See id. at 417–18. 
23 See id. at 436–37. 
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people, for example, from unequivocally answering “yes” when asked 
whether existence should trump interests. Responses to tragic disasters 
such as the catastrophic 2004 Asian tsunami24 and the 2011 Japanese 
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown25 suggest that prioritizing 
existence over self-interest enjoys wide, if tacit, acceptance. At those 
moments, we saw that the world actually is prepared to care about 
strangers, and to care across the boundaries of nation and culture.26 
One could look at those tragic events as community-building moments 
that evidence a kind of global constitutionalism that already exists in 
our world. Each of those disasters called forth an acknowledgement 
that we are all members of the same species; that obligations do not 
cease just because harm happens to fall on somebody else’s doorstep; 
and that money and aid must change hands because alleviating some-
body else’s misery is worth more to us than preserving our own assets. 
 Thus, we see some counter-economic principles already at work at 
a global scale. They rise to view in moments of global crisis that draw 
out people’s empathy.27 Therefore, to some extent, the barriers we 
need to identify and dismantle are ones created by ideologies and 
modes of reasoning that funnel our thinking and keep us from acting 
on these common sensibilities. Professor Kysar’s analysis of how welfare 
economics creates such narrowing is brilliant.28 It follows that one way 
to move the discussion forward is to unpick the perverse analytic man-
tras that we have taught to generations of legal and policy analysts so 
that they cannot think in other terms, even when ethics and morality 
call for different ways of thinking.29 The blocking routines of technical 
expertise are embedded in a variety of institutional practices. The fol-
lowing Parts focus on two such practices. 
                                                                                                                      
24 Amy Waldman, Thousands Die as Quake-Spawned Waves Crash onto Coastlines Across 
Southern Asia, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 2004, at A1. 
25 Martin Fackler, Powerful Quake and Tsunami Devastate Northern Japan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
12, 2011, at A1. 
26 See Stephanie Stron, U.S. Charity Overwhelmed by Disaster Aid, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 2005, 
at A10; Malia Wollan, Help from the U.S. for Afflicted Sister Cities in Japan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 
2011, at A23. 
27 See Stron, supra note 26; Wollan, supra note 26. 
28 See Douglas A. Kysar, Politics by Other Meanings: A Comment on “Retaking Rationality Two 
Years Later,” 48 Hous. L. Rev. 43, 76 (2011). 
29 See Jasanoff, supra note 5 (explaining that because science and technology domi-
nate, “democratic nations must reinvent their practices of governance in the interests of 
building more just, inclusive, and promissory futures”); Sheila Jasanoff, The Songlines of 
Risk, 8 Envtl. Values 135, 150 (1999). 
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III. The Impact of Juridical Institutions on Global 
Environmental Constitutionalism 
 Deeply-embedded technical thinking within our legal and juridical 
institutions has adverse impacts on making necessary changes. For ex-
ample, in Massachusetts v. EPA, a case that turned out “right” from the 
standpoint of climate policy, the Supreme Court conferred standing on 
the states in international environmental issues and held the EPA re-
sponsible for its failure to take action on climate change.30 In dissent, 
however, Justice Scalia made a subtle argument about whose knowledge 
should hold legal weight in situations of scientific and legal uncer-
tainty.31 
 Justice Scalia argued that law trumps when there is a contest of 
authority between science’s right to declare the state of the world and 
law’s right to declare who declares the scientific state of the world.32 He 
invoked the Supreme Court’s precedent, which requires an administra-
tive agency’s interpretation of the law to prevail in situations of legal 
ambiguity and uncertainty.33 When Congress creates the law it cannot 
practically prescribe the details of administrative rulemaking.34 There-
fore, we want agencies to have discretion so that the legislature does not 
have to micro-manage everyday regulatory judgments.35 In Massachu-
setts v. EPA, the EPA, according to Justice Scalia, quite properly con-
strued its obligation to mean that under the Clean Air Act, air pollution 
does not refer to stratospheric conditions.36 Justice Scalia opined that 
the Court does not have the authority to overrule the EPA when the 
agency decides that, under an air pollution control law, it does not have 
to regulate something affecting stratospheric conditions.37 
                                                                                                                      
30 549 U.S. 497, 520–21, 531–32 (2007). 
31 See id. at 549–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
32 See id. at 553. 
33 See id.; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
34 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (reasoning that when Congress does not legislate “on 
the level of specificity” to accommodate all circumstances, Congress may have “consciously 
desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great 
expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a 
better position to do so”). 
35 See id. (holding that because agencies are politically accountable through the Presi-
dent, “an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, with-
in the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of 
wise policy to inform its judgments”). 
36 549 U.S. at 559 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
37 Id. at 560. 
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 Implicit in that analysis, however, was also an assertion of national 
sovereignty. A second part of Justice Scalia’s argument could be inter-
preted as saying that, even if world scientific authorities decide there is 
a supra-national problem out there, the United States government can 
still continue to administer our laws as written, even if doing so evades, 
or even contradicts, the global understanding.38 This reasoning indi-
cates how the use of legal precedents can erect significant barriers to 
acknowledging scientific evidence on problems of global scale.39 In ef-
fect, Justice Scalia seemed to be saying that the very possibility of know-
ing something about the global environment—in this case, that the 
world is at risk from catastrophic climate change—only arises through 
national legal and administrative determinations,40 because a regula-
tory agency such as the EPA is authorized to create valid public knowl-
edge in accordance with procedures specified by its own governing 
administrative law, without concern for internationally accepted scien-
tific determinations.41 As it happened, Justice Scalia’s analysis did not 
prevail in Massachusetts v. EPA, but there is a serious point to be drawn 
from his dissent nonetheless about the frictions that exist between na-
tional legal developments and the prospects for a meaningful global 
constitutionalism based on science. 
 Each society and government has learned how to hold its own ad-
ministrative agencies accountable; despite imperfections and much 
cross-national variation, legal rules and processes exist for doing so in 
most democratic nations.42 There is no agreement, however, on how to 
implement accountability at the global level. My own comparative re-
search on technical decision-making in Great Britain, Germany, and 
the United States shows that the governments of these three countries 
handle scientific uncertainties in substantially different ways that some-
times lead to significantly different regulatory outcomes.43 The variety 
                                                                                                                      
 
38 See id. 
39 See id. at 552–53 (criticizing the Supreme Court majority for straying from precedent 
and refusing to give deference to the EPA under the Chevron doctrine even though the 
“EPA's interpretation is not only reasonable, it is the most natural reading of the text”). 
40 See id. at 560 (“This is a straightforward administrative-law case, in which Congress has 
passed a malleable statute giving broad discretion, not to us but to an executive agency. No 
matter how important the underlying policy issues at stake, this Court has no business substi-
tuting its own desired outcome for the reasoned judgment of the responsible agency.”). 
41 See id. 
42 See Sheila Jasanoff, Constitutional Moments in Governing Science and Technology, 17 Sci. 
& Engineering Ethics 621, 630 (2011). 
43 Sheila Jasanoff, Trading Uncertainties: The Transatlantic Divide in Regulating Biotechnol-
ogy, 6 CESifo DICE Rep., no. 2, 36, 37–39 (2008); see also David Winickoff et al., Adjudicat-
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of responses to the “Climategate”44 controversy provides an example of 
this phenomenon. In the United States, after the University of East An-
glia emails were hacked and published in November 2009, survey data 
showed that “climate denialists” seemed to get a significant boost and 
more people turned skeptical for a time.45 Climate denialism in Great 
Britain saw a similar boost.46 In Germany, however, there was no com-
parable shift in public opinion.47 This suggests that global environ-
mental expertise enjoys different levels of credibility in different na-
tions, depending in part on the mechanisms in place for addressing 
uncertainty and building political consensus. Those mechanisms in-
clude the make-up and role of expert advisory committees and the ways 
that these bodies interact with legislatures, the executive branch, and 
the public, for example, through balance and disclosure require-
ments.48 Because of these differences, the same scientific claims may 
not have the same impacts on policy in different nations or cultures. 
Therefore, even Western industrial nations, despite their many political 
similarities and common interests, do not produce shared understand-
ings about the state of the world. Until nations consistently approach 
uncertainty, they will remain unable to develop common normative 
principles on the basis of which their citizens will claim stewardship for 
the planet and for future generations. 
                                                                                                                      
ing the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 Yale J. Int’l L. 81, 
88, 100–01 (2005). 
44 Andrew C. Revkin, Hacked E-Mail Data Prompts Calls for Changes in Climate Research, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 2009, at A8. Climategate refers to the 2009 leak of hacked emails be-
tween a small group of climatologists studying global warming. Id. The emails revealed 
possible attempts to cover up scientific evidence and withhold certain data from public 
scrutiny. Id. 
45 See Frank Newport, Americans’ Global Warming Concerns Continue to Drop, Gallup (Mar. 
11, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/126560/Americans-Global-Warming-Concerns- Con- 
tinue-Drop.aspx?version#2. 
46 See Randeep Ramesh, Public Support for Tackling Climate Change Declines Dramatically, 
Guardian (London) (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/ 
07/public-support-climate-change-declines. 
47 It Runs in the Family, Harv. Magazine, July 30, 2010, http://harvardmagazine.com/ 
2010/07/jasanoff-family-at-harvard. 
48 See Sheila Jasanoff, Judgment Under Siege: The Three-Body Problem of Expert Legitimacy, in 
Sociology of the Sciences: Democratization of Expertise? Exploring Novel Forms 
of Scientific Advice in Political Decision-Making 209, 211–12, 217–19 (Peter Wein-
gart & Sabine Maasen eds., 2005). 
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IV. The “Precautionary Principle” and Global  
Environmental Constitutionalism 
 Deeply embedded institutional practices also affect our methods of 
responding to the incompleteness of information on climate change. 
Professor Wirth discussed the “Precautionary Principle” or the “Precau-
tionary Approach” to decision-making under conditions of uncer-
tainty.49 I agree that this is a productive field of thought, and one that 
should be further discussed and developed by scholars and policymak-
ers. There are, however, different ways in which the world seems to 
think about “precaution” at this moment.50 From the standpoint of 
global constitutionalism, I see one of these ways as productive and the 
other as potentially detrimental. 
 The first precautionary approach is to create a common adminis-
trative framework for dealing with uncertainty, and to include within 
that framework multiple viewpoints and attitudes toward safeguarding 
the future.51 For this approach, an important prototype is the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”).52 Although the IPCC 
has its critics,53 it is an institution promoting global environmental con-
stitutionalism through both scientific and participatory means at a time 
when such institutions are sadly lacking. 
 The IPCC began with a fairly rigid idea of who may speak for sci-
ence in the global arena. During the preparation of the First Assess-
ment Report, peer review was an ad hoc process, conducted without 
formal guidelines, and largely followed traditional scientific norms in 
the selection of peers.54 After the release of that Report, however, the 
                                                                                                                      
 
49 See David A. Wirth, Precaution in International Environmental Policy and United States Law 
and Practice, 10 N. Am. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 221, 226 (2003) (examining “the role of regulatory 
philosophy of precautionary decision making in the United States law and policy”); Wirth, 
supra note 1, at 435–36. 
50 See infra notes 51–71 and accompanying text (describing two competing interpreta-
tions of the precautionary approach). 
51 See John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 Wm. & Mary Envtl. 
L. & Pol’y Rev. 13, 17–20 (2002) (breaking down into elements various formulations of the 
precautionary principle). 
52 The IPCC “is the leading international body for the assessment of climate change. It 
was established . . . to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of 
knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic im-
pacts.” Organization, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, www.ipcc.ch/or- 
ganization/organization.shtml#.UU8w*BzCaSo (last visited May 14, 2013). 
53 Mike Hulme et al., IPCC: Cherish It, Tweak It or Scrap It?, 463 Nature 730, 730 (2010) 
(featuring multiple reviews of the IPCC, including Hulme’s opinion that the panel should 
be dissolved). 
54 See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change: The 
IPCC Scientific Assessment, at app. 4 (1990) (listing the reviewers of the IPCC Working 
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IPCC broadened the range of people invited to introduce their knowl-
edge into the assessment process.55 Recognizing the need for political 
and scientific credibility, the IPCC decided to seek more consistent re-
view by several different classes of experts: “specialists with significant 
publications in particular areas, experts named in IPCC ‘master lists’ 
based on information supplied by various governments and organiza-
tions, and specialist reviewers nominated by international organizations 
including those in the United Nations system, The World Bank, Third 
World Academy of Sciences,” and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development.56 The IPCC also intensified its efforts to 
seek participation by developing country experts, for example, by fund-
ing their trips to meetings and requiring their inclusion as lead au-
thors.57 Thus, in the IPCC’s successive reports,58 there is not only a re-
duction of expert uncertainty about how the climate is changing, but 
also a simultaneous co-production of a new international democracy of 
knowledge-making.59 In this procedural evolution, more communities 
are being encouraged to participate and present their knowledge and 
perspectives, regardless of their scientific, political, or administrative 
legal cultures.60 This represents a positive step toward greater inclusion 
and a more comprehensive global dialog on precaution. 
 There is, regrettably, a second approach to precaution that is less 
hospitable to broad political representation and to the concerns of 
non-experts. This approach is grounded in a kind of backlash against 
participatory democracy that I see coming from the policy analytic 
world. It tends to undercut the more positive developments observable 
in the IPCC. The counter-movement derives from a somewhat unex-
pected alliance between the fields of behavioral economics, policy anal-
ysis, and democracy theory. 
 Influential recent work in behavioral economics and social psy-
chology suggests that people do not behave in an economically rational 
                                                                                                                      
Group I report), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg_I/ipcc_far_wg_I_app_ 
04.pdf. 
55 See Mike Hulme, The IPCC on Trial: Experimentation Continues, Envtl. Res. Web ( July 
21, 2010), http://environmentalresearchweb.org/cws/article/opinion/43250. 
56 Shardul Agrawala, Structural and Process History of the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change, 39 Climatic Change 621, 626 (1998). 
57 Id. at 629–30. 
58 The IPCC’s four assessment reports are all available online at http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#.UZEa6LXgOuL (last visited 
May 14, 2013). 
59 See Winickoff et al., supra note 43, at 115 n.169. 
60 See Agrawala, supra note 56, at 623–32. 
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manner when they are put in experimental situations.61 Consistent with 
Professor Kysar’s argument, however, there is a rather limited notion of 
rationality that underpins this work.62 Rationality is often tied exclu-
sively to the ways in which people assess mathematical probabilities of 
gain and loss from expenditures of money.63 If, for example, the ex-
perimental subject is given one dollar and asked to save that money or 
spend it for a stated purpose, the subject’s choice should remain the 
same whether the choices are described in terms of “losses” or “gains.” 
Experimental results show, however, that people are routinely more 
inclined to take a risk when the choice is presented in terms of a poten-
tial gain rather than a potential loss.64 This failure to respond in the 
same way to the same likelihood of winning or losing is thought to be 
irrational.65 
 This recent economic research has constructed, in essence, a pow-
erful image of human beings as fundamentally irrational—as agents 
who come into every situation with biases that get in the way of clear 
thinking and correct choice. From this perspective, the precautionary 
approach looks like an irrational idea, based on blinders in the brain 
that prevent us from seeing the state of the world as it actually is. One 
of these blinders causes us to overvalue the things we have now more 
than the things that we are promised in the future,66 even when those 
future gains outweigh the resources of the present. Professor Kysar’s 
point that we should value the present state of the world with its biodi-
versity over a future state in which we do not have the same biodiversity 
might well be written off by these researchers as irrational.67 Perhaps 
we would be better off, from this viewpoint, not with the species that 
currently populate the Earth but rather with gene banks from which we 
could constitute in the future an infinite array of known and unknown 
species. Why, after all, should we settle for the haphazard assortment of 
species that we have inherited through the accidents of evolution when 
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science in the future might offer us different, more varied worlds? If 
precaution tends to prefer the status quo, then—on this reasoning—
precaution should be rejected as a backward-gazing policy that does not 
do justice to our capacity to remake the world and to make it better. 
 The problem with such thinking is that it substitutes the wisdom of 
experts for the wisdom of all of society.68 In the field of innovation stud-
ies, it is customary to speak of “convergent technologies,” that is, differ-
ent technological systems that interact synergistically to produce new 
goods for society.69 I see behavioral economics, social psychology, risk 
analysis, and public policy as powerful convergent technologies of rea-
son, which through their synergy aim to characterize humans more ac-
curately rather than to better serve our moral intuitions. This move-
ment offers a strong counter-force against the IPCC’s moves toward 
greater democratization of global environmental knowledge, because, 
in effect, these descriptive scientists are de-skilling those outside their 
fields by depreciating their very capacity to understand and assess risks 
responsibly.70 On the subject of rationality, the experts might say that 
critiques like Professor Kysar’s do not really make much sense because 
they are driven by biases toward conservatism and a mistaken valuation 
of the present in relation to the future. Such experts might further as-
sert that, because most people do not recognize their own biases, the 
work of projecting and realizing alternative futures should be left to the 
specialists who master the right technologies of rationality.71 They will 
tell us how to make organized, understandable, collective judgments 
about our common future. Then indeed we will have a form of global 
constitutionalism, but it will be based on experts’ reasoning and not on 
ours. 
Conclusion 
 Global environmental constitutionalism, I have suggested, should 
not be seen exclusively as a problem for international law or interna-
tional relations theory, though the participation of these disciplines is 
essential. To make progress, we need to recognize other ways in which 
the foundations for constitutionalism are being laid, albeit in forms 
that legal analysis tends not to take into account. Science and expertise, 
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in particular, operate as powerful drivers of collective thinking about 
environmental governance, but their role is neither transparent nor 
necessarily consistent with democratic norms. Expert institutions such 
as the IPCC can play a valuable role as sites of learning where diverse 
modes of global knowledge-making and diverse experiments in partici-
patory decision-making are worked out together. These experiments, 
however, may flounder if what I call the convergent technologies of ra-
tionality persist in representing human minds as irrationally fearful and 
incapable of making well-considered decisions about when to lean to-
ward precaution and when to opt for novel futures. 
 Law, like science, can either facilitate or inhibit creative thinking 
about a global constitutional order. My story about Brown v. Board of 
Education illustrates the power of legal discourse to move people, help-
ing to translate widely held moral intuitions—those reflected in altruis-
tic responses to environmental disasters for example—into robust prin-
ciples of constitutional governance. Rigid legalistic thinking, however, 
can undermine the processes of global agenda-setting, especially if 
judges elevate concerns for national sovereignty above the need for col-
lective action at the global level, as Justice Scalia arguably did in his dis-
sent in Massachusetts v. EPA. Science and law, finally, are both human 
institutions, human in their frailty but human also in their inbuilt ca-
pacity for change. In a time of mounting concern about our threatened 
future, it is well to remember that the institutions we have built are 
meant to serve us, and not forget that neither scientific nor legal exper-
tise sits beyond questioning or beyond reform. 
